Suchergebnisse

Foreword / George P. Shultz -- Campaign strategy -- The New South rises : competition for the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 -- Down to political defeat : Reagan's inability to break Ford's coalition in the 1976 primaries -- Reshaping the domestic and international landscape, part 1 : the long road to the 1980 presidential election -- Reshaping the domestic and international landscape, part 2 : the 1980 presidential election -- Fighting the nomenklatura's privileges : the rhetorical campaign of 1986-88 -- Yeltsin's winning campaigns : down with privileges and out of the USSR, 1989-91 -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

"In 1983, U.S.-Soviet relations appeared to be in an uncontrollable free fall. It was the year Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire," announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, and obtained permission from Western European governments to deploy intermediate nuclear forces (INF) on their soil. The Soviet government retaliated by walking out of the INF and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. Yet, just two years later, Reagan and new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held their first summit and jointly declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Between 1988 and 1991, peaceful revolutions spread throughout Eastern Europe as the Warsaw Pact nations embraced democracy. These historic events defied widespread expectations, as many experts expected the cold war to end with a nuclear war. Why were they proved wrong?" "The essays in this collection offer illuminating insights into the key players - Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and others - and the monumental events that led to the collapse of communism. The expert contributors examine the end of detente and the beginning of the new phase of the cold war in the early 1980s, Reagan's radical new strategies aimed at changing Soviet behavior, the peaceful democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary, the events that brought about the reunification of Germany, the role of events in Third World countries, the critical contributions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and more."--BOOK JACKET

"In 1983, U.S.-Soviet relations appeared to be in an uncontrollable free fall. It was the year Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire," announced the Strategic Defense Initiative, and obtained permission from Western European governments to deploy intermediate nuclear forces (INF) on their soil. The Soviet government retaliated by walking out of the INF and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks. Yet, just two years later, Reagan and new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev held their first summit and jointly declared that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Between 1988 and 1991, peaceful revolutions spread throughout Eastern Europe as the Warsaw Pact nations embraced democracy. These historic events defied widespread expectations, as many experts expected the cold war to end with a nuclear war. Why were they proved wrong?" "The essays in this collection offer illuminating insights into the key players - Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and others - and the monumental events that led to the collapse of communism. The expert contributors examine the end of detente and the beginning of the new phase of the cold war in the early 1980s, Reagan's radical new strategies aimed at changing Soviet behavior, the peaceful democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary, the events that brought about the reunification of Germany, the role of events in Third World countries, the critical contributions of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and more."--Jacket

Includes bibliographical references (p. 305-320) and index. ; Foreword / George P. Shultz -- Acknowledgments -- Campaign strategy -- The new South rises: competition for the Republican presidential nomination in 1968 -- Down to political defeat: Reagan's inability to break Ford's coalition in the 1976 primaries -- Reshaping the domestic and international landscape, part 1: the long road to the 1980 presidential election -- Reshaping the domestic and international landscape, part 2: the 1980 presidential election -- Fighting the nomenklatura's privileges: the rhetorical campaign of 1986-88 -- Yeltsin's winning campaigns: down with privileges and out of the USSR, 1989-91 -- Conclusions -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Skinner reviews 'Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader,' by Dinesh D'Souza; 'The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War,' by Beth A. Fischer; and 'Exit With Honor: The Life and Presidency of Ronald Reagan,' by William Pemberton.

International rivals often employ foreign aid to shape international institutions and alliances. This paper asks whether Americans are more supportive of allocating aid to Latin America when they learn about China's aid programs in the region. Since the average citizen lacks detailed knowledge about foreign policy, communication frames could influence citizens' support for aid. We, therefore, examine how various framing devices (national pride, humanitarian value, and instrumental value) affect public support for aid. Drawing on social psychology's model of self-identifying with a group, we argue that one's awareness of donor competition should boost support for aid. We innovate by using two dependent variables: support for giving US aid and the willingness to donate one's own resources. A survey experiment with a high-quality sample of 2700 respondents reveals that rivalry has a different effect on these dependent variables: informing respondents of donor rivalry increases support for US aid but has no effect on respondents' willingness to donate their own reward. Additionally, exposing subjects to the combination of rivalry and all three frames boosts approval for using tax dollars as aid; however, only national pride and humanitarian value appeals strengthen the respondents' willingness to donate their own earnings.

State indiscriminate violence against civilians has been viewed as counterproductive for the government. This conclusion hinges on the assumption that indiscriminate violence aggrieves civilians against the government even when the rebels provoke the state by using civilians as human shields. An alternative view suggests that civilians recognize if the rebels exploit them as human shields and blame the rebels if such provocation occurs. We ask: do civilians evaluate all state indiscriminate violence in the same way or do they think of state indiscriminate violence differently when it is provoked by insurgents? Accounting for the covariate differences between individuals with and without personal experience of warfare in the survey data from postwar Ukraine, we find that personal exposure to violence shapes one's blame attribution for provoked state attacks on civilians. Individuals unexposed to violence tend to take into account whether the government was provoked by the rebels. By contrast, individuals with personal experience of warfare tend to blame the government for indiscriminate attacks regardless of rebel provocation. This finding has implications for counterinsurgency scholarship and policy. It is likely that the difference between unexposed and exposed to violence civilians emerges in geographically isolated conflicts. If so, targeting of civilians may have different effects on the escalation of insurgency in geographically concentrated as opposed to widespread cases of violence.